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Abstract
Niger has the fastest population growth in the world while being among the least 
developed countries. With an average fertility above seven children per woman in 
the last decades, rapid population growth will continue in the medium to long term 
representing a planning challenge for Niger’s development whose actual popula-
tion is likely to double within the next two decades. At the same time, socio-eco-
nomic variables whether in terms of health, wealth, and education levels are lag-
ging behind, also relatively to many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While both 
demographic and education variables occupy a central position in the government 
strategy, they are not necessarily linked. However, the future of Niger will largely 
be a reflection of its ability to meet both challenges. Within a project piloted by the 
Ministry of Planning and funded by the United Nations Children’s Fund, we have 
derived together with local experts and stakeholders narratives about the possible 
future of Niger. These were further translated into five scenarios with assumptions 
about different future paths of demographic and educational development for Niger 
that were used to project the population, also at sub-national level, using multi-state 
population projection models with the aim to inform policy. This article reports 
some projection results related to educational and demographic developments.
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Introduction
Niger has the fastest population growth in the world while being among the least 
developed countries. According to the last census of 2012 (Census 2012), the popu-
lation of Niger was 17.1 million inhabitants, and had been growing at an average 
annual rate of 4.1% since the previous census of 2001 (10.8 million), while in 1977, 
the country only had 5.1 million inhabitants. This sharp increase has been especially 
caused by fertility that has been on average above seven children per woman at least 
since the 1950s. Nowadays, Niger has the highest fertility rate in the world (United 
Nations 2019). This high fertility, coupled with a decline in mortality rates, espe-
cially of children under 5 years of age (the under-five mortality rate declined from 
318 to 127 deaths per 1000 live births between 1992 and 2012 (Spoorenberg and 
Issaka Maga 2018) will generate a further substantial and inevitable increase in the 
population in the medium term to long term, which represents a planning challenge 
for Niger’s development. This is why demographic variables occupy a central place, 
both in recent strategy documents of the government.1
At the same time, the social, economic, environmental and technological devel-
opment of the country requires that the youth population receive a quality education. 
However, the high population growth complicates the challenge of education for all 
and the enhancement of all social sectors in general because of the ever-increasing 
needs. According to the latest census, In 2012, 77% of the working-age population 
(aged 15–64) had not received any formal education and 5% an incomplete primary 
education—for women, the respective rates were 82% and 4%.
This research brief presents the main results of a project looking at demographic 
and education future to 2062 in Niger (also at sub-national level), that also resulted 
in an exhaustive report (Goujon et al. forthcoming). The project was conducted in 
partnership with the ministry of Planning of Niger and was funded by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The project assumes the importance of educa-
tion for human development and its impact on demographic behaviour and shows 
through multidimensional projections of population by level of education the dif-
ferent faces that Niger could take in the future. Indeed, much research, especially 
since the 1980s, has shown that women’s education is strongly correlated with fer-
tility trends, also in sub-Saharan Africa (Kraval 2002; Bongaarts 2010). Not only 
do most educated women have fewer children in their lives compared to those who 
have received less or no education, but also increasing levels of education would 
most likely translate into fertility decline, especially during demographic transition. 
Moreover, education is negatively related to mortality, and in particular women’s 
education to infant and child mortality. In Niger, women with a secondary or higher 
education had on average 3 children less than women with a primary education or 
less (4.9 children vs. 7.9 children) over the 2009–2012 period. As well, the mortal-
ity rate was 38% higher for infants born to a woman without education compared 
to those born to a woman with a secondary education or more (Niger DHS 2012). 
1 For example, the Strategy for Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth (SDDCI) Niger 2035 
and the Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES) 2017–2021).
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While migration streams have been shown to be selective in terms of migrants’ edu-
cation (e.g. Docquier and Marfouk 2006) in regard to origin and destination coun-
tries, the data in Niger does not allow for a thorough analysis of the main trends and 
their educational composition.
Data and Methodology
The multidimensional population projection method (Keyfitz 1985; Rogers 1975) is 
based on the expansion of the cohort and component projection model. In the multi-
dimensional model, the population is disaggregated by age, sex and by dimensions. 
The education dimension is ideal for the application of the multidimensional popu-
lation projection model, as education is mainly acquired at an early age and changes 
along cohort lines. Therefore, changes in the educational composition of the total 
population are mostly caused by the depletion (by mortality) of the less educated 
older cohorts and the entry of younger, more educated cohorts.
Following this approach, we developed EDUDEMPRO, a projection tool with 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). In the model, four dimensions are dynami-
cally projected: age, gender, region of residence and education. In order to run, the 
model requires the initial population, fertility, mortality and migration according to 
those characteristics as well as the transition between education categories together 
with assumptions about the future developments of all determinants.
The initial population is taken from the 2012 Census. We used the 1992, 1998, 
2006 and 2012 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data to establish trends 
and estimates of total- and age-specific fertility rates by level of education and 
regions. For lack of valid data, the initial mortality data as well as the future mor-
tality assumptions by education for the scenarios originate from global population 
projections (Lutz et al. 2014), for which mortality tables by level of education were 
produced for all countries in the world. In the absence of credible data on differen-
tial mortality by region, the assumptions are the same for the eight regions of Niger, 
translating into a difference of 6 years in life expectancy between the highest and the 
lowest education category for men, and 4 years for women. We used the 2012 Cen-
sus to build assumptions about the internal mobility in the base year using questions 
about previous residence. In the trend scenario, mobility rates are quite low, the net 
migration over a 5-year period varying between − 0.4% (Diffa) to 0.3% (Niamey). 
International migration is omitted in the model, given the absence of reliable data 
and its high volatility. Nevertheless, the International Organization for Migration 
(2019) reports marginal net migration values and therefore, it should not influence 
the size and composition of the population—assuming that this trend continues in 
the future. For education, each scenario assumes distinct evolution patterns. These 
assumptions are based on narratives developed with local experts and stakeholders, 
but also on empirical statistical modelling of past trends. The purpose of statistical 
modelling is to obtain parameters capturing, on the one hand, the cohort effect (the 
"trend" in changes between successive age groups) which then makes it possible to 
establish assumptions about the future, and on the other hand the differences by sex 
and region.
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Five scenarios were derived from the narratives built in an interactive way and in 
close collaboration with the members of the project steering committee composed 
mainly of key persons from the relevant ministries (Planning, health and education 
ministries), the national statistical institute (INS), and the CAMOS2 and CAPEG3 
units. The scenarios were based on narratives that were conceptualized in three 
steps: First, the methodology and rationale of multi-state projections were presented 
to the committee members in Niamey together with a set of standard scenarios for 
Niger as a whole (February 2018). At this occasion, we exchanged with the com-
mittee on the possible narratives, taking into account the several government plan in 
the relevant sectors (based on meetings with the education, population, health min-
istries). With this information, we developed a few scenarios built upon assumptions 
about the future of fertility, mortality and mobility that were presented together with 
the projection findings at national and regional levels in June 2018 to the Commit-
tee (in Niamey). This lead to a revised version for the steering committee that met in 
October 2018 in Austria, at the occasion of the visit of a delegation to the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Table 1 summarizes both the 
final narratives and main scenarios assumptions. Deriving narratives and scenarios 
together with officials faced several challenges that stemmed from the difficulty for 
officials to abstract from government plans for the purpose of building scenarios, 
and their expectation for simple fit-all solutions. On the other hand, the committee 
members show understanding for the limit imposed by the lack of data to estimate 
some indicators at the regional level.
Main Results
Niger’s population would be growing rapidly in all scenarios (Fig. 1). The ’vicious 
circle’ scenario, which assumes constant fertility (and mortality) in the next 50 years 
and the stagnation of educational levels, yields a population of 131 million in 
2062, six times higher than the 2012 population. In contrast, the ’upturn’ scenario, 
in which fertility declines quickly, enables Niger to reach a population three times 
lower, i.e. 50 million inhabitants in 2062, which is still more than twice the size of 
the 2012 population. The other scenarios lead to intermediate future population. The 
’trend’ scenario translates into an increase of the population up to 106 million in 
2062, 91 million in the case of the ’rural development’ scenario and 78 million for 
the ’evolving’ scenario. As a consequence of the population momentum and with 
the exception of the ’upturn’ scenario, until 2037, the population varies only slightly 
between the different alternatives, with hardly more than 3 million difference in total 
population. Differences in the impact of different scenarios on the total population 
appear mainly after 2040.
2 A unit in charge of supporting the implementation of the sectorial program for Education and Training 
(PSEF).
3 A unit in charge of analysing public policy and assessing government action.
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At the regional level, in the ’trend’ scenario, the population is multiplied by a 
factor of five and more in all regions between 2012 and 2062 (see Table 2). The 
demographic future of the capital Niamey is however particular, due to internal 
migration. The scenario that would generate the smallest population by 2062 would 
be the ’rural development’ scenario, which implies that regions develop the agricul-
tural and agro-industrial sectors and keep their labour force. In this case, the popu-
lation would increase from 1 to 3.2 million between 2012 and 2062 mainly due to 
natural increase. On the contrary, the population of Niamey would be substantially 
increased in the case of the ’upturn’ scenario, from 1 million in 2012 to 10.5 million 
in 2062 as the city would attract the higher educated population of the regions. For 
other regions, this scenario leads to the lowest growth compared with the others.
The age structure is strongly affected by the different scenarios as shown in Fig. 2 
representing the demographic dependency ratio [calculated as the ratio of children 
(0–14 years old) and elders (65+) on people of working age (15–64)]. In 2012, there 
were 120 dependents per 100 people of working age. In the ’trend’ scenario, this 
ratio would be roughly stable until 2037, then would decline to 70 by 2062. This 
slow decline in the early years can largely be explained by the meagre decrease 
in fertility rates. In the ’upturn’ scenario, fertility begins to decline rapidly at the 
beginning of the projection period. As a result, the demographic dependency ratio 
drops drastically and reaches a low of about 40 by 2047. In 2062, the demographic 
dependency ratio equals 40 both according to the ’evolving’ and ’upturn’ scenarios, 
but it takes longer to achieve this level in the former than in the latter, pushing back 
the time when Niger could benefit from a demographic dividend.
At the regional level, significant gaps exist in the demographic dependency ratio. 
The Niamey region is in a much better position compared with others, with a ratio of 
80 dependents in 2012, while ratios are higher than 110 in all other regions. Niamey 














1-Trend 2- Rural development 3-Upturn
4-Evolving 5- Vicious circle
Fig. 1  Niger’s total population (in million), several scenarios, 2012–2062. Source: Authors’ calculations
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Niger 1-Trend 17,117,679 47,819,624 105,751,587
2-Rural development 44,855,780 90,866,429
3-Upturn 35,795,349 49,647,176
4-Evolving 45,683,323 77,909,210
5-Vicious circle 46,571,291 130,795,211
Agadez 1-Trend 487,134 1,432,205 2,772,626
2-Rural development 1,176,702 2,282,827
3-Upturn 1,174,561 1,862,261
4-Evolving 1,244,425 2,224,559
5-Vicious circle 1,402,357 3,274,483
Diffa 1-Trend 592,429 1,364,766 2,291,890
2-Rural development 1,303,226 2,355,997
3-Upturn 1,014,614 1,032,594
4-Evolving 1,329,019 1,843,367
5- Vicious circle 1,332,829 2,753,854
Dosso 1-Trend 2,036,604 5,789,076 12,466,899
2-Rural development 5,409,263 11,174,245
3-Upturn 4,263,839 5,334,540
4-Evolving 5,544,826 8,502,827
5-Vicious circle 5,749,085 16,393,102
Maradi 1-Trend 3,399,086 10,284,710 24,142,186
2-Rural development 9,689,505 21,143,220
3-Upturn 7,265,583 9,045,657
4-Evolving 9,774,854 15,851,226
5- Vicious circle 9,901,481 30,580,724
Niamey 1-Trend 1,025,732 2,778,529 8,210,359
2-Rural development 2,232,320 3,191,570
3-Upturn 3,161,934 10,511,297
4-Evolving 2,285,538 9,533,746
5-Vicious circle 2,537,575 5,895,375
Tahoua 1-Trend 3,322,215 8,886,910 19,039,651
2-Rural development 8,608,807 17,477,879
3-Upturn 6,457,027 7,588,253
4-Evolving 8,704,962 14,250,011
5-Vicious circle 8,547,808 23,301,190
Tillaberi 1-Trend 2,720,718 7,439,937 15,187,120
2-Rural development 7,131,153 14,334,805
3-Upturn 5,357,019 5,846,447
4-Evolving 7,297,179 11,105,063
5- Vicious circle 7,530,563 21,359,424
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drops to 40 in 2062, while it still oscillates between 60 and 80 in the other regions. 
This difference can be explained firstly by an already lower fertility in Niamey, and 
secondly by its migratory advantage, the region having a net positive net migration 
with a large population of young adults.
The significant potential changes we have highlighted in terms of total population 
are both the consequence and the cause of profound changes in the educational lev-
els of the population. Figure 3 decomposes the projected population by educational 
attainment.
Apart from the ’vicious circle’ scenario, the share of the population with an 
incomplete primary education or less decreases considerably among the popula-
tion aged 15 and over, from 83% in 2012 to 35–64% in 2037 and to 11–37% in 
2062 depending on the scenario. This decrease goes hand in hand with an increase 
in the population with secondary or higher education, already within the ’trend’ 
scenario (35% in 2062) but even more so in the other scenarios and especially in 
the ’upturn’ scenario: More than 50% of 25–39  year-old would have a secondary 
Table 2  (continued)
Country/region Scenario Year
2012 2037 2062
Zinder 1-Trend 3,533,761 9,843,492 21,640,856
2-Rural development 9,304,804 18,905,886
3-Upturn 7,100,772 8,426,126
4-Evolving 9,502,520 14,598,410









2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052 2057 2062
1.Trend 2.Rural development 3.Upturn
4.Evolving 5.Vicious circle
Fig. 2  Projected demographic dependency ratio, 2012–2062, several scenarios, Niger. Source: Authors’ 
calculations
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or higher education in 2037 and more than 85% in 2062. When comparing cohorts, 
the difference is minimal in 2012 due to the stall in education progress: only 6% of 
25–39 year olds have a secondary or higher education compared to 4% for the older 
generation aged 40 and over. In contrast, in 2037, the difference would widen with 


































































Fig. 3  Niger’s population by level of education, 2012–2062, several scenarios. Source: Authors’ calcula-
tions
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only 10% of those aged 40 and over would have a secondary or higher education 
– as they would not benefit from the progress envisaged by this scenario—compared 
to 42% of the 25–39 age group. By 2062, progress is visible in both generations. 
The 25–39 age group representing the most productive part of the population could 
play a significant role in the development of the country. However, the other side of 
the coin is that like population, education change has a large momentum and there 
would be for a long time a substantial proportion of the population with low levels 
of education, between 40 and 64% in 2037 and 12 and 37% in 2062 (all scenarios 
considered except ‘vicious circle’). Moreover, this population would continue to 
increase in absolute terms, with the exception of the ‘upturn’ scenario, even if at a 
slower rate than in the past. The annual growth rate will be + 1% in the ’evolving’ 
scenario, + 2% in the ’rural development’ scenario and + 3% in the trend scenario.
The education momentum is also visible in the eight regions where the projected 
educational attainment varies according to the scenarios and to the starting situation. 
The educational structure of the Niamey region is different depending on whether it 
attracts the highest educated population of the other regions (’trend’, ’upturn’ and 
’evolving’ scenarios), if the level of education does not progress (’vicious circle’ 
scenario) or if the educated population stays in the origin region (’rural develop-
ment’ scenario). If the ’trend’ scenario allows for a noticeable increase in the edu-
cational attainment in all regions, this will not be substantial until 2037. For exam-
ple, the proportion of the population age 15 + without a complete primary education 
decreases by 74% to 52% in 2037, then to 25% in 2062. The intensification of efforts 
would make it possible to reduce this share significantly but not in the near future. 
This results in an increase in the population with lower secondary education or 
higher, which is faster for the 20–39 age group than for the 40+.
Conclusion
With demography and education having a strong inertia, Niger will have to face a strong 
demographic growth in the short and the medium term. Indeed, even in the case of a 
rapid decline of the fertility, several decades will be necessary before the population sta-
bilizes. At the same time, the education levels of a majority of the population will remain 
low. The inevitability of these facts calls for swift and radical action to be able to provide 
the people of Niger with a better quality of life. The regions will also see their devel-
opment seriously influenced by the present conditions. The scenarios show that some 
inequalities in population or education may be accentuated or reduced in the future.
The different findings point at the necessity of three different policy priorities: 
First of all, focus on combing population growth, possibly through awareness cam-
paigns and increase in the availability of family planning; second, increase invest-
ments in education, that could both generate a declining fertility and increase the 
productivity of both men and women in the country. Third, the regions have differ-
ent need and therefore those should be taken into account.
‘Education does not jump’, this sentence of economist Schumacher (1973) simply 
illustrates the need to invest today in mass and quality education. Any child who 
passes through the meshes of education or who receives an inadequate education, 
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not allowing him/her to be literate or to integrate into the labour market, will keep 
this status over his/her lifetime. It should be noted that increased in the quantity of 
education should not occur at the expense of quality.
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